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I
INTRODUCTION
Over the last thirty years the courts have relied increasingly on statistical evi-
dence in employment discrimination cases. During this period the nature of
acceptable statistical evidence has changed markedly. Initially, the courts typi-
cally compared the percentage of black employees in a firm with the percentage of
blacks in the general population. If the disparity were substantial, the burden of
proof would shift to the defense. Subsequently, the concept of statistical signifi-
cance was introduced in court cases, and recently the results of regression analyses
have been introduced. Each case, however, was judged on its merit; there was no
simple rule for determining under what conditions the burden shifted to the
defense.
Impetus for increased use of more sophisticated statistical methodologies has
come from the guidelines promulgated by the federal administrative agencies that
have responsibility for employment discrimination. Since Griggs v. Duke Power Co., I
these guidelines have been entitled to "great deference." '2 Since 1978 an important
change has occurred in the administrative guidelines. These agencies have devel-
oped an "80% rule ' 3 whereby an employer will not normally be prosecuted under
Title VII if the selection rate or promotion rate of each group is more than 80% of
the selection or promotion rate of any other groups. 4 In practice, the rule and the
provision mean that if the selection or promotion rate of a group is more than 80%
of the selection or promotion rate of all other groups, an employer cannot be found
to be in violation of Title VII.
Unlike previous guidelines and legal decisions, the four-fifths rule is relatively
straightforward and easy to implement. Consequently, it is not surprising to find
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leading employment discrimination commentators, such as Blumrosen, 5 to be in
favor of the rule. In this article it is argued that both the rule and the administra-
tive agencies are misdirected, and that the use of the 80% rule represents a step
backwards and diverts the court from its progress towards more well reasoned
decisions.
This article.is divided into two parts. First, there is a review of the develop-
ment of employment discrimination case law. This review categorizes cases and
presents an analytic framework of the courts' decisions. Second, there is an anal-
ysis of the potential impact and ramifications of the 80% rule. It is concluded, first,
that the courts have progressed in their understanding of appropriate statistical
methodologies and the situations in which these techniques should be applied, and
second, that the 80% rule-of-thumb, while simple, has serious weaknesses.
II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASE LAW
A. The Burden of Proof in Discrimination Cases Under Title VII
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act states "[i]t shall be an unlawful employ-
ment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, [or] sex." 6 This title, which Professor Schlei has
referred to as "a mighty engine that is gradually forcing the alteration of the
employment practices of a nation in innumerable ways,' ' 7 has had an impact far
beyond the expectations of its drafters. Originally, the bill was intended primarily
to address adverse treatment, that is, malevolent discrimination towards individ-
uals who argued that they had been the victims of overt discrimination. However,
since Grzggs in particular, Title VII has formed a basis for dealing with discrimina-
tion against protected groups, even if there were no overt intention to discriminate
on the part of the employer.
In a discrimination case the plaintiff must produce sufficiently damaging evi-
dence of discrimination to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Over the
years the nature of the evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case of dis-
crimination has altered markedly. In particular, the incidence of use of statistical
evidence has risen dramatically, and in some suits gross statistical disparities alone
have been sufficient to shift the burden of proof.8 The purpose of this section is to
examine the role of these prima facie statistics in employment discrimination cases.
5. See Blumrosen, The Bottom Line in Equal Employment Guidrhnes: Adminstering a Polcentric Problem, 33
AD. L. REV. 323 (1981); Blumrosen, The Bottom Line Concept in Equal Employment Opportunity Law, 12 N.C.
CENi. L. REV. 1 (1980).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
7. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW xii (2d ed. 1983).
8. See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) ("Statistics are
equally competent in proving employment discrimination [as in proving discrimination in jury selec-
tion]."); Kaplan v. International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees, 525 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th
Cir. 1975) ("[S]howing wholly disproportionate female membership in a union in comparison to the avail-
able female work force in a demographic area . . . is sulicient to establish a prima facie case of sex discrim-
ination."); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. dented, 404 U.S.
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Two major issues must be considered. While a variety of different statistical
comparisons have been made in different circumstances, the first issue has been to
determine whether a particular comparison is appropriate in a particular situa-
tion. Once an appropriate comparison has been made, the second issue has been
to determine whether the disparity is "substantial." Analysis of the second issue
shows that the courts are currently more willing to allow relatively weaker evi-
dence of discrimination to shift the burden of proof than they were in the past;
evidence that is now considered to be sufficient would not have been considered as
such ten or fifteen years ago.
The courts have considered two types of discrimination cases-adverse treat-
ment cases and adverse impact cases. 9 These terms are defined in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States.1° In adverse treatment cases, "[t]he
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'' Proof of discrimination in such
cases focuses on employers' alleged discriminatory motivation and intent, typically
manifested by actions of individual, malevolent discrimination. Alternatively, the
plaintiff may follow the guidelines developed in the case of McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green. 12 An individual may shift the burden of proof by showing:
(i) [T]hat he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job
for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. 13
If that showing is made, the employer must then "articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."' 14 If the defendant carries
this burden, the plaintiff then has an opportunity to show that the employer's
stated reason was pretextual, a cover up for racial, sex, or ethnic discrimination.
Recently, in Texas Department of Communi'ty Affairs v. Burdine,15 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed these procedures but emphasized that after the burden shifts to the
defendant, the defendant has only to explain the nondiscriminatory reason for its
actions and "need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the
proffered reasons." 16
While individual testimony is central to determine intent, statistical evidence
is, nonetheless, relevant. In Teamsters the court ruled that in a disparate treatment
case "[p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations
984 (1971) ("In many cases the only available avenue of proof is the use of racial statistics to uncover
clandestine and covert discrimination by the employer or union involved.").
9. The distinction between a disparate treatment case and a disparate impact case is not synonymous
with the difference between an individual action and a class action. See, e.g., Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d
957, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Throughout this article adverse is used synonymously with disparate.
10. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
11. Id. at 335 n.15.
12. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
13. Id. at 802.
14. Id.
15. 450 U.S. 248 (1975).
16. id. at 254.
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be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment."' 7 Subsequently, in
Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,i8 the Supreme Court has ruled that "[p]roof that his
work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high
percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent
when that issue is yet to be decided."' 9
Statistical evidence may also be relevant to showing that the employer's expla-
nation is merely a pretext. For example, in McDonnell Douglas the Court ruled that
"statistics as to petitioner's employment policy and practice may be helpful to a
determination of. . . a general pattern of discrimination against blacks."' 20 Such
statistical evidence is important because, as Schlei and Grossman note, "the great
majority of disparate treatment cases turn on the plaintiffs ability to demonstrate
that the nondiscriminatory reason offered by the employer was a pretext for
discrimination.",2 1
Since Grzggs v. Duke Power Co., 22 a second type of discrimination case has
steered attention away from motivation and intent to the effect of an allegedly
discriminatory practice, that is, adverse impact. The Supreme Court observed
that Title VII is not concerned with employer's "good intent or absence of discrim-
inatory intent" and "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation.
23
Adverse impact cases "involve employment practices that are facially neutral
in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one
group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity."' 24 The proce-
dure in an adverse impact case was developed in Griggs and refined in Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody25 and subsequent cases. The plaintiff initially has to make a
prima facie showing of discrimination which, in general, requires demonstrating
that the pattern or practice of hiring or promotion has a disparate impact upon a
protected group. The burden of proof then shifts to the defendant who may
(1) refute the plaintiffs evidence and argue that the pattern or practice does not,
in fact, have a substantial disparate impact on a protected group, 26 or (2) argue
that the existing pattern or practice arises from a "job-related criterion or a policy
or practice which is a business necessity."'2 7 Where tests or standards are involved
"Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given
requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question."
28
"If an employer does then meet the burden of proving that its tests are 'job
17. 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
18. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
19. Id. at 580.
20. 411 U.S. at 805.
21. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1317.
22. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
23. Id. at 432.
24. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335, n.15.
25. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
26. The employer may show that the plaintiff's "proof" is either "inaccurate or insignificant." Team-
sters, 431 U.S. at 360.
27. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1328.
28. Grzggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
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related,' it remains open to the complaining parties to show . . . the employer was
using its tests merely as a 'pretext' for discrimination. ' 29 Because of the need to
examine effects of hiring and promotion practices, statistical evidence has played
an increasingly dominant role in adverse impact suits.
The importance of statistics in discrimination cases has been affirmed by a
whole series of cases since 1962. 30 However, the nature of the statistical evidence
used by the courts has changed considerably. To clarify this development, a
typology of the possible types of parity studies is presented.
B. A Typology of Probative Parity Comparisons
In most cases using parity studies, statistics are presented which compare the
percentage of a particular set of actual or potential minority employees with the
percentage of that minority group in the available qualified pool. 3 1 For example,
some courts have made population/work force comparisons in which the per-
centage of black employees is compared with the percentage of blacks in the gen-
eral population. Some parity studies have made applicant flow comparisons in
which the percentage of protected group members who are hired is compared with
the percentage of protected group members in the pool of applicants. There is
much debate over what subset of protected group employees in the firm should be
used and to what subset of protected group employees in the general population
this should be compared. A major issue in discrimination cases is the circum-
stances under which a particular type of parity study may be probative. Our next
task is to present, in a parsimonious way, the set of all possible probative parity
studies.
When reading the cases it is important to make sure that one knows the
29. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
30. See, e.g., Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 620 (1973) ("Statis-
tical analyses have served and will continue to serve an important role as one direct indicator of racial
discrimination."); Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("We have previously indicated,
and now explicitly hold, that statistical evidence may establish aprumafacte case of employment discrimina-
tion in an individual case."); Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 527 (6th Cir. 1976),cert. denied,
429 U.S. (1976) ("Statistical evidence is an important tool for placing seemingly inoffensive employment
practices in their proper perspective .... An employee is at an inherent disadvantage in gathering hard
evidence of employment discrimination particularly when the discrimination is plant-wide in scope. It is
for this reason that we generally acknowledge a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII.");
Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 259 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. dented, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975)
("Statistics are particularly appropriate in Title VII class actions where it is the aggregate effect of a
company's policy on the class which is important."); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d
211, 225 (5th Cir. 1974); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1382 (4th Cir.
1972),cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112, 120 (5th Cir. 1972)
("While we abjure any desire to become involved in a numbers game, statistics such as these do have some
relevance in a Title VII pattern and practice suit."); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d
418, 442 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. dented, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 444 F.2d 687, 689
(5th Cir. 1971) ("We believe it evident that if the statistics in the instant matter represent less than a shout,
they certainly constitute far more than a mere whisper."); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d
421, 426 (8th Cir. 1970) ("We hold as a matter of law that these statistics . . . established a violation of
Title VII."); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 247 (10th Cir. 1970),cert. dented, 401 U.S.
954 (1971); Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1961), aftd, 371 U.S. 37 (1961) ("In the
problem of racial discrimination, statistics often tell much, and Courts listen."). See also supra note 8.
31. We use the term "minority" for convenience. If the protected group is gender-based it may, of
course, not be a numerical minority.
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meaning of such expressions as the "percentage of blacks hired." The phrase may
mean the percentage of blacks in the set of hired individuals. Alternatively, it may
mean the percentage of hires from the group of black applicants. This important
distinction is worth explaining in some detail by a simple example. Suppose there
are n, protected group members in the population and n 2 majority group mem-
bers, and the total population is N (N = n, + n 2). Of the n i protected group
members, x , meet some criterion (for example, satisfy a requirement, pass a test,
are hired or selected). Of the n 2 majority group members, x 2 meet the same crite-
rion, and the total number of people who meet the criterion is Y (Y = x , + x 2).
The court may compare the percentage of the protected group selected with the
percentage of the protected group in the general population represented by x 1Y
vs. n 1/N. Alternatively, the court may compare the pass rate of the protected
group with the pass rate of the majority group represented by x 1/n , vs. x 2 /n9 .








xI x 2  Y
, -x 1  n2 -x 2  N- Y
n 1 n 2 N
Parity studies may involve an examination of the work force composition at a
particular time, which means that the "stock" of employees is being considered.
Other studies examine new hires, assignments, or promotions over time; these
studies are concerned with "flows." Data may be presented which concern the
total "stock" or total "flow" of employees in an organization, or which concern the
"stocks" or "flows" at particular levels or into particular types of jobs. Thus the
"percentage of protected group employees" may be the percentage in: (1) the total
work force, (2) the work force at a particular level or of a particular type, (3) the
total new hires, or (4) the new hires, assignments, or promotions to a particular
level or particular set of jobs. The first two comparisons involve "stocks," the last
two involve "flows." Where allegedly biased requirements (including tests) are
involved, the courts typically consider a fifth comparison: (5) the percentage of
protected group employees in the pool of potential employees, that is, those
employees who meet the requirement (such as pass the test). These five
comparisons constitute the rows in Table 2, a typology of relevant statistical
comparisons. 32 Every case in the fourth row, for example, concerns the percentage
32. The table is comprehensive in the sense that every possible type of comparison is represented by
one of the 20 cells. While most major employment discrimination cases are presented in the table, it is not
intended to be comprehensive in the sense that it includes every case that has used statistics. In some cases
more than one comparison has been made, and in these circumstances, the case name appears in more than
one cell.
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of recent hires, assignments, or promotions that is protected.
These percentages must be compared with the percentage of some reference
group that is protected. Initially, the reference group was the general population.
In more recent cases, comparisons are made to the minimum qualified work pool,
the set of applicants, or to the set of total employees (or set of employees at a
different level or in different jobs); these reference groups constitute the columns in
Table 2. For example, a case would appear in cell N if, during the case, the
percentage of recent hires, assignments, or promotions that is protected is
compared with the percentage of applicants that is protected. This is an example
of an applicant-flow comparison.
Cells A and B involve population/work force comparisons. Cell A involves all
employees while cell B involves employees at a particular level or set of jobs. The
legitimacy of using cell A and B studies was confirmed by the court in Teamsters.
The Supreme Court endorsed cell A comparisons by saying that:
Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a case such as this one only
because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent explana-
tion, it is ordinarily expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a
work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the popula-
tion in the community from which employees are hired.
3 3
The actual data in Teamsters concerned line drivers, who are a particular set of
employees. Thus the actual data pertain to cell B: "With one exception . . . the
company and its predecessors did not employ a Negro on a regular basis as a line driver
until 1969. And, as the Government showed, even in 1971 there were terminals in
areas of substantial Negro population where all of the company's line drivers were
white. 34
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co .35 can be placed in cell A because evi-
dence was introduced which showed that, while fewer than 2% of their employees
were nonwhite, approximately 22% of the general population of Arkansas was
black. 36 Since data were also presented which concerned the number of employees
in particular categories, Parham has also been placed in cell B.
Population/work force comparisons have often been regarded as probative.
Nonetheless, the courts are aware of many significant, potential problems. Many
of these problems are overcome by the use of alternative probative statistics and
are discussed later. One problem that has never been completely resolved is the
appropriate definition of "community from which employees are hired" or "rele-
vant geographic region." '37
The "stock" comparisons presented above were often sufficient to shift the
burden of proof to the defendant. However, such statistics could not differentiate
between what may have been discriminatory behavior prior to the effective date of
Title VII (July 2, 1965) and subsequent employment practices. In Teamsters the
33. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 324, 339 n.20 (1977).
34. Id. at 337 n.17.
35. 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
36. Id. at 424, 426 n.4.
37. See Smith & Abram, Quanitative Anayss and Proof of Employment Discrimination, 1981 U. ILL. L. F.
33, 59-60.
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TABLE 2













Employers' Teamsters b Hazelwood





Work force at a Teamsters Agarwal Fisher













C H M R
Recent hires to Parham Hazelwood Ochoa
whole firm Roman Agarwal Hazelwood
Swint b
Agarwal
D I N S
Recent hires, Teamsters Fumco Hester b Rowe
assignments or Hesterb Wade Baxter
promotions to Patterson NAACP (Ensley) James
particular level, Agarwa/ Agarwal Johnson




E J 0 T
Candidates for Griggs Albemarleb Chance
hire or Dothard Green James
promotion Johnson Kirland
Boston NAACP
a Another level within the firm may refer to the whole organization.
b This type of parity study was not used but it was endorsed in this case.
C In Chance comparison was made to similar positions in different organizations.
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Supreme Court ruled that once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case "[a~n
employer might show . . . that the claimed discriminatory pattern is a product of
pre-Act hiring rather than unlawful post-Act discrimination. '38  Rather than
focusing on "stock" comparisons, statistics should be presented which consider the
"flow" of new hires since the effective date of Title VII. Unfortunately for the
Teamsters when such data were analyzed, "the record shows that many line
drivers continued to be hired throughout this period [late 1960's], and that almost
all of them were white."'39
Pre-Act data may be introduced but they "serve only as a basis for compar-
ison." 4 In Parham, population/work force comparisons using data from Sep-
tember 1964 and December 1966 showed no "noticeable increase in the number of
blacks employed. '41 Implicitly, by comparing data for different time periods, the
court was examining "flows" typical of cell C. In fact the defense explicitly intro-
duced data concerning new hires.42 However, the court ruled:
While an employer's more recent employment practices may bear upon the remedy sought,
they do not affect the determination of whether the employer previously violated Title
VII.4 3
The crucial issue in a lawsuit of this kind is whether the plaintiff establishes hiring bias at
the time of his rejection for employment and subsequent complaint to the EEOC . . .44
Thus, flow data are relevant, but only for the time between the effective date of the
Act and the date the complaint is filed.
In Griggs the employer required new employees to possess a high school
diploma and to register satisfactory scores on two standardized aptitude tests in
order to qualify for placement in any department except labor. Statistical evi-
dence taken from the 1960 census was presented which showed that in North Car-
olina "while 34% of white males had completed high school, only 12% of Negro
males had done so."'4 5 Even more damaging evidence was presented concerning
the pass rates on the standardized tests.4 6 There was, in effect, a substantial dis-
parity between the percentage of black males in the pool of potential employees
and the percentage of black males in the general population. Consequently Grzggs
appears in cell E.
Situations where comparisons should involve the qualified work pool (column
2) rather than the general population (column 1) are described in Hazelwood School
Dzstrnct v. United Slates :4
In Teamsters, the comparison between the percentage of Negroes on the employer's work
force and the percentage in the general areawide population was highly probative because
38. 431 U.S. at 360.
39. Id. at 341.
40. Parham, 433 F.2d at 424.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 425 ("In 1967, 6.1 percent of the Company's new employees were blacks. This figure
increased markedly to 17.6 percent, or 135 blacks of 766 new employees, in 1968.").
43. Id. at 426.
44. Id. at 425.
45. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, at 430 n.6 (1971).
46. Id. ([A] battery of tests. . . resulted in 58% of whites passing the tests, as compared with only 6%
of the blacks.").
47. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
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the job skill there involved-the ability to drive a truck-is one that many persons possess
or can fairly readily acquire. When special qualifications are required to fill particular jobs,
comparisons to the general population (rather than to the smaller group of individuals who
possess the necessary qualifications) may have little probative value.
4 8
In this case the Supreme Court ruled that "a proper comparison was between the
racial composition of Hazelwood's teaching staff and the racial composition of the
qualified public school teacher population in the relevant labor market.
49
The importance of job qualifications had been recognized earlier by the
Supreme Court in Mayor of Philadelphia. v. Educational Equahty League .50 In this case
the Third Circuit had found a substantial disparity between the percentage of
blacks on a panel that nominated persons for vacancies on the Philadelphia School
Board and the percentage of blacks in the general population.5' The Supreme
Court in reversing the appellate court ruled:
[Tihis is not a case in which it can be assumed that all citizens are fungible for purposes of
determining whether members of a particular class have been unlawfully excluded ....
(A]ssuming, arguendo, that percentage comparisons are meaningful in a case involving dis-
cretionary appointments, the relevant universe for comparison purposes consists of the
highest ranking officers of the categories of organizations and institutions specified in the
city charter, not the population at large.
5 2
When qualifications are essential for the job and the data presented to the
courts concern hires or promotions rather than the total work force, the courts
have argued that comparison should be made with the qualified work force rather
than with the general population. In Hester v. Southern Railway Co .53 the court of
appeals ruled:
[C]omparison with general population statistics is of questionable value when we are con-
sidering positions for which, as here, the general population is not presumptively qualified.
Data Typist applicants were required to prove their ability to type at a minimum speed of
sixty corrected words per minute as a prerequisite to consideration by Southern for employ-
ment . . . . A more significant comparison might perhaps be between the percentage of
blacks in the population consisting of those able to type 60 wpm or better and the per-
centage hired into the Data Typist position by Southern.
5 4
Similarly, in Patterson v. American Tobacco Co .,55 the Fourth Circuit stated:
The record discloses that 6.8 percent of the blacks and 1.5 percent of the women in the
Richmond [Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area] are placed in a category that includes
supervisory personnel. Those percentages furnish a more realistic measure of the company's
conduct than the gross percentage of blacks and women in the whole work force, including
unskilled labor.
5 6
In Hazelwood the Supreme Court certainly regarded as important a comparison
of the percentage of new teachers who were black with the percentage of black
48. Id. at 308 n.13.
49. Id. at 308.
50. 415 U.S. 605 (1973).
51. Id. at 611 (Initially, the district court "held that differences between the percentage of Negroes in
the city's population (34%) or in the student body of the public school system (60%) and the percentage of
Negroes on the 1971 Nominating Panel (15%) had no significance.").
52. Id. at 620, 621.
53. 497 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1974).
54. Id. at 1379 n.6.
55. 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976).
56. Id. at 275.
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teachers in the relevant labor market.57 Although the Court did not define the
relevant labor market it noted that the choice was important and indicated some
considerations that should be evaluated. 58
Consequently, comparisons to the qualified work pool rather than the general
population are important for both "stock" and "flow" comparisons. A different
type of comparison involves not the whole set of potential employees in the quali-
fied work pool, but the set of applicants. It makes little sense to compare the
composition of the work force "stock" with the composition of the applicant pool
and so cells K and L are empty. Of much more interest is a comparison of the new
"flow" of employees (recent hires, promotions, or assignments) with the applicant
pool. These applicant/flow cases are listed in cells M and N.
Although applicant/flow data were unavailable in Hazelwood, the Court real-
ized that such data would "be very relevant" 59 and "might tell a totally different
story."'60 Further, the Supreme Court ruled: "It will also be open to the District
Court on remand to determine whether sufficiently reliable applicant-flow data
are available to permit consideration of the petitioner's argument that those data
may undercut a statistical analysis dependent upon hirings alone."'6 1 Several other
cases have suggested that applicant/flow data are more probative than work
force/population comparisons. In Ochoa v. Monsanto Co .62 there was a substantial
disparity between the percentage of Mexican-Americans employed and the per-
centage of Mexican-Americans in the general population, and yet this evidence
was found not to constitute a prima facie finding of discrimination, in part because
the company's applicant/flow data showed that Mexican-Americans had recently
been hired at a faster rate than whites.63
Where job requirements or tests are an issue, the Supreme Court's ruling in
Albemarle is germane. The Court ruled that the complaining party or class can
make out "a prima facie case of discrimination . . . [by showing] that the tests in
question select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly
different from that of the pool of applicants. '64 This quote proposes a different
comparison from that made in Griggs. While Grtggs compares the percentage of
blacks who were selected for hire with the percentage of blacks in the general
population, Albemarle suggests the comparison should be between the percentage of
blacks selected for hire and the percentage of black applicants. For this reason we
place Albemarle in cell 0 of Table 2. It is important to note, however, that this
57. 433 U.S. at 310 ("The record in this case showed that for the 1972-1973 school year, Hazelwood
hired 282 new teachers, 10 of whom (3.5%) were Negroes; for the following school year it hired 123 new
teachers, 5 of whom (4.1%) were Negroes. Over the two-year period, Negroes constituted a total of 15 of
the 405 new teachers hired (3.7%)." These percentages could have been compared with the percentage of
teachers in St. Louis and the city of St. Louis who were black (15.4%) or the percentage of teachers in St.
Louis County alone who were black (5.7%).
58. Id. at 311, 311 n.17, 312.
59. Id. at 308 n.13.
60. Id. at 310.
61. Id. at 313 n.21.
62. 335 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Tex. 1971), aft'd, 473 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1973).
63. Id. at 59.
64. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
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assignment is based on the above statements, not on the actual prima facie evi-
dence presented in Albemarle, which concerned seniority systems.
While applicant/flow data may be more probative than population/work force
comparisons, there are problems. An important problem is described in detail in
Teamsters:
If an employer should announce his policy of discrimination by a sign reading 'Whites
Only' on the hiring-office door, his victims would not be limited to the few who ignored the
sign and subjected themselves to personal rebuffs. The same message can be communicated
to potential applicants more subtly but just as clearly by an employer's actual practices-
by his consistent discriminatory treatment of actual applicants, by the manner in which he
publicizes vacancies, his recruitment techniques, his responses to casual or tentative
inquiries, and even by the racial or ethnic composition of that part of his work force from
which he has discriminatorily excluded members of minority groups. 65
In other words, past discriminatory practices may "chill" the applicant pool.
The fourth column of Table 2 compares the percentage of minority group
members actually employed or potentially employed with the percentage of
minority employees in the entire firm or at some other hierarchical level of the
firm. By definition, cell P contains no entry. As Table 2 suggests, however, com-
parisons of type Q are often regarded as probative. In Teamsters, for example, the
evidence concerned systemwide discrimination:
[T]he company had 6,472 employees. Of these, 314 (5%) were Negroes and 257 (4%) were
Spanish-surnamed Americans. Of the 1,828 line drivers, however, there were only 8 (0.4%)
Negroes and 5 (0.3%) Spanish-surnamed persons, and all of the Negroes had been hired
after the litigation had commenced . . . . A great majority of the Negroes (83%) and
Spanish-surnamed Americans (78%) who did work for the company held the lower paying
city operations and serviceman jobs, whereas only 39% of the nonminority employees held
jobs in those categories. 6 6
In the first part of this quote the Supreme Court is comparing the proportion of
line drivers who are protected with the proportion of total employees who are
protected. In the last part, the proportion of protected employees at a less desir-
able position is implicitly compared with the proportion of protected employees at
a more desirable level.
In Fisher v. Procter & Gamble Manufacturing Co .,67 a more recent case, the plain-
tiffs argued that in making cell B and cell Q comparisons they have established a
prima facie case of discrimination. The company countered by arguing that a cell
G comparison was most relevant. The Fifth Circuit decided that the company
would be estopped from using the qualified work force argument in rebutting dis-
parity when the firm itself engages in substantial training for these skilled
positions.6
When a company adopts a policy and practice of hiring in at low-level unskilled jobs and
promoting to upper-level positions based upon training received and skills developed at the
plant itself, it cannot convincingly challenge the prima facie showing under the Hazelwood
'qualifications' dicta. Where skills are commensurate with company training, we will
65. 431 U.S. at 365.
66. Id. at 338.
67. 613 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1115 (1981).
68. Similar arguments are presented in James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 341
(5th Cir. 19 7 7),cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978) and Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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approve statistical comparisons between racial make-up in key positions and racial compo-
sition in the total work force.
6 9
Comparisons to a level in the firm or to the whole firm are not made just when
the work force at a particular level is examined. It is also relevant when the focus
is on flows (cell S) or on candidates for hire or promotion when tests are involved
(cell T).
One of the strongest conclusions that emerges from the table is that few cases
rely on a single type of comparison. Teamsters, for example, is listed in four cells.
The most frequently cited case, Agarwal v. McKee & Co., 70 appears in eight cells.
The plaintiff does not rely upon a few statistical comparisons to shift the burden of
proof, but upon developing a complete picture of the employer's practices.
Whether the plaintiff is successful depends in part on the magnitude of the dis-
parity. It has to be "significant."
C. The Meaning of "Significance" in Employment Disparity Cases
The analysis is summarized in Table 3, which presents five "criteria" or meas-
ures that have been applied to determine whether the employment disparity is
significant, thereby shifting the burden to the defendant. Generally the measures
are more sophisticated as one moves down the column. Also, this order approxi-
mates the way the courts have changed over time. The change appears to be a
function of both the courts' increasing statistical sophistication and the changing
nature of employment discrimination that has come before the courts, that is, from
obvious and overt discrimination to subtle and covert discrimination.
While we are concerned primarily with employment discrimination cases, con-
sideration of discrimination in jury selection cases provides a valuable historical
perspective in this context. Prior to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, plaintiffs brought
cases to the Supreme Court claiming an unconstitutional denial of equal protec-
tion. In such cases the magnitude of disparity that was sufficient to shift the
burden of proof to the defense was very large. In extreme cases, no protected
group member was currently or ever had been in the selected jury group. In effect,
there was total exclusion or only token representation of minorities on juries. The
use of such evidence in "rule of exclusion" cases dates back over one hundred years
to Neal v. Delaware.7 ' At that time, over 17% of the population was black but "no
colored citizen had ever been summoned as a juror in the courts of the State." 72
Another example is provided by Norris v. Alabama 73 which dates back to 1935.
While blacks comprised over 7.5% of the adult males in the county, "no negro had
served on any grand or petit jury in that county within the memory of witnesses
who had lived there all their lives."'7 4 Similar exclusionary evidence was presented
in Hill v. Texas ,75 Patton v. Mississippi, 7 6 Hernandez v. Texas 77 Arnold v. North Caro-
69. Fisher, 613 F.2d at 544.
70. 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8301 (1977), aft'd, 644 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1981).
71. 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
72. Id. at 397.
73. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
74. Id. at 591.
75. 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
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Irna ,78 and Harper v. M'ississippi.79
TABLE 3
CRITERIA TO JUDGE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DISPARITY
James Neal Frank
Rule of Watkins Norris Arnold
Exclusion Wade Hill
Teamsters Perce
Overwhelming, Parham Hazelwood Rowe Kaplan
or gross, Teamsters Senter Swint
disparity Dothard James Griggs
Fisher Johnson Dickerson
Castaneda Davis











Total exclusion of a protected group has also been observed in employment
discrimination cases: it carries considerable importance and obviates the need for
detailed, narrow attacks. In Teamsters, for example, the Supreme Court observed
that:
In any event, fine tuning of the statistics could not have obscured the glaring absence of
minority line drivers. As the Court of Appeals remarked, the company's inability to rebut
the inference of discrimination came not from a misuse of statistics but from 'the inexorable
zero'.
8 0
Other employment discrimination cases in which there was a total exclusion or
token representation of protected group members from at least some type of jobs
include Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co .,81 Rogers v. International Paper Co .,82 Wade
76. 332 U.S. 463, 466 (1947) ("It is to be noted at once that the indisputable fact that no Negro had
served on a criminal court grand or petit jury for a period of thirty years created a very strong showing that
during that period Negroes were systematically excluded from jury service because of race.").
77. 347 U.S. 475, 480 (1953) "[Plroof that Negroes constituted a substantial segment of the population
of the jurisdiction, that some Negroes were qualified to serve as jurors, and that none had been called for
jury service over an extended period of time, was held to constitute prima facie proof of the systematic
exclusion of Negroes from jury service.").
78. 376 U.S. 773 (1964).
79. 251 Miss. 699, 707, 171 So. 2d 129, 133-34 (1965) ("[Ljong continued omission of Negroes from
jury service establishes a prima facie case of systematic discrimination.").
80. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23 (1977).
81. 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
82. 510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975).
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v. Mssissippi" Cooperative Extension Service ,83 and James v. Stockham Valves and Fittngs
CO .84
Total exclusion is sufficient to shift the burden of proof, but such an obvious
degree of discrimination is not always necessary. More frequently there is a "sub-
stantial" disparity or a "substantial" underrepresentation of a group which is short
of total exclusion. 8 5  Synonyms that have been used by the courts include
"gross," 8 6 "marked," ' "compelling," 88 and "wholly disproportionate."8 9
In the cases discussed above, a cursory examination of the employers' employ-
ment practices suggested obvious discrimination. In these cases, therefore, the rel-
atively gross "rule of exclusion" or "substantial" disparity criterion could be used
to shift the burden of proof so that there were few statistical problems. Nonethe-
less, as will be seen below, some of the courts' early encounters with discrimination
data reveal considerable uncertainty and a lack of understanding of the role of
statistics. This is illustrated by the cases in row three of Table 3 which are based
on arbitrary percentage differences.
In Swain v. Alabama,9° a jury selection case, "[t]he evidence was that while
Negro males over 21 constitute 26% of all males in the county in this age group,
only 10 to 15% of the grand and petit jury panels drawn from the jury box since
1953 have been Negroes. ... 91 The Court admitted that "[w]e cannot say that
purposeful discrimination based on race alone is satisfactorily proved by showing
that an identifiable group in a community is underrepresented by as much as
10%." '92 Of course, the Supreme Court should have said "underrepresented by as
much as 16%." In any case, the 10-16% range of disparity became the basis for
future decisions. For example, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Test 93 stated:
In the present cases the maximum disparity demonstrated by defendants between the
percentages of blacks and Chicanos in the voting-age community and on the master jury
rolls was approximately 4%. Since this figure is well below the 10-16% range of disparity
approved in Swaih, the district court properly concluded defendants had failed to establish
a prima facie case of systematic exclusion and accepted the government's general explana-
tions and asseverations of good faith in rebuttal. 94
Disparities were found to be significant in Jones v. Georgia ,95 where the disparity
was 14.7% (19.7% of tax list, 5% of jury roles); Sms v Georgia , 96 where the disparity
83. 528 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1976).
84. 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977).
85. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 (1977).
86. See, e.g., Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307; Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 n.1 (1977).
87. See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429; Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 357 n.18 (5th Cir.
1972).
88. Fisher v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 527, 544 (5th Cir. 1980),cert. denied, 449U.S. 1115
(1981).
89. Kaplan v. Int'l Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees and Motion Picture Mach. Operators,
525 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1975).
90. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
91. Id. at 205.
92. Id. at 208-09.
93. 550 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1976).
94. Id. at 587.
95. 389 U.S. 24 (1967).
96. 389 U.S. 404 (1967).
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was 19.7% (24.4% of tax lists, 4.7% of grand jury lists); Whitus v. Georgia , 9 7 where
the disparity was 18% (27.1% of taxpayers, 9.1% of grand jury venire); Turner v.
Fouche,98 where the disparity was 23% (60% of general population, 37% of grand
jury lists); and Castaneda v. Partida,99 where the disparity was 40.1% (79.1% of
county population, 39% of persons summoned for grand jury).
Arbitrary percentage comparisons have been introduced in employment dis-
crimination cases attacking allegedly discriminatory requirements. The compari-
sons, however, are not quite analogous to those used in jury selection cases.
Referring back to Table 1, one can see that jury selection cases examine the dis-
parity between the percentage of a protected group in the general population
(n I/N) with the percentage of the protected group on jury lists (x /Y). In employ-
ment discrimination cases, selection rates are compared as follows: x , vs. X2n 2.
For example, in Grzggs 12% of black males had completed high school while 34% of
white males had done so.' ° ° This particular arbitrary percentage difference is
important because subsequent cases have used it as a benchmark. 0 1 Sometimes in
employment discrimination cases, however, the courts make an additional step
and compute the selection ratio which is compared to some arbitrary number.
The selection ratio of whites to the protected group was 2.6 in Castro v. Beecher,
0 2
3.5 in Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Ciil Service Commission, 03 and
1.3 in Chance v. Board of Examiners.' 0 4 The courts may also compute failure rates:
(n I - x -)/n , vs. (n 2 - x 2)/n 2. For example, in Davis v. Washigton 105 the failure rate
was 47% for blacks and 12% for whites so that "[t]he disparity disclosed in this
case-more than four to one-is larger than differences held sufficiently dispropor-
tionate in other cases."' 0 6 In Green v. Missouri Pacific Rairoad Co.,107 the failure rate
for blacks was two and one-half times that of whites.
One problem with computing a ratio should be immediately apparent: the
outcome depends upon whether one computes the pass ratio or the fail ratio. In
Davis the failure ratio was four to one but the pass ratio was 1.66 to one, a major
difference. Another factor is the magnitude of the statistics. In Davis the failure
rate for blacks was four times that for whites. However, if the failure rate for
blacks had been 4% and the failure rate for whites had been 1%, the ratio would
still have been four to one, but there would have been much less reason for con-
cluding that blacks had been systematically excluded. 0 8
The courts' examination of percentage differences and their attempts to relate
these differences to some benchmark reflect concern for the magnitude of the dif-
97. 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
98. 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
99. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
100. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971).
101. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977).
102. 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972).
103. 482 F.2d 1333 (2d.Cir. 1973).
104. 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
105. 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
106. Id. at 960.
107. 523 F.2d 1290, 1295 (8th Cir. 1975).
108. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 106 n.87.
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ferences and the probability that the difference could have occurred by chance.
To a statistician these concepts are quite distinct although related: ceterisparbius,
the larger the difference the lower the probability that it could have occurred by
chance, that is, thep value. Consequently, in many situations, it is reasonable for
the Supreme Court to argue, as it did in Castaneda, "[i]f a disparity is sufficiently
large, then it is unlikely that it is due solely to chance or accident, and, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, one must conclude that racial . . . factors
entered into the selection process." 10 9 As long as the disparities were sufficiently
large or exceeded some arbitrary value, the courts avoided the issue of statistical
significance.
In their discussions of chance, which date from the early 197 0s, the courts first
ruled that plaintiffs and defendants did not have to prove or justify their case
"with complete mathematical certainty."' 10 Impetus for the use of the concept of
statistical significance came from the 1974 EEOC Guidelines"' which, since
Griggs, are "entitled to great deference.""12  In 1975 the Supreme Court, in
Albemarle, accepted the evidence of an expert witness who "regarded as 'statisti-
cally significant' any correlation that could have occurred by chance only five
times, or fewer, in 100 trials."'1 3 Thus the 5% level of significance or 95% level of
confidence became one of several criteria for establishing a prima facie case.
An alternative approach to using a significance or confidence level is to calcu-
late the number of standard deviations by which the observed result differs from
the result expected if there had been no discrimination. The 5% level of signifi-
cance approved in Albemarle is equivalent to 1.96 standard deviations and so is
consistent with the "two or three standard deviations" criterion approved in
Castaneda. 114
Many courts subsequently have mentioned an explicit threshold of signifi-
cance, such as a 5% level or two or three standard deviations. However, the Fifth
Circuit has warned that the significance criterion "must not be interpreted or
applied so rigidly as to cease functioning as a guide and become an absolute man-
date or proscription."'' 5  Similarly, in United States v. Test, the Tenth Circuit
argued that "[t]he mathematical conclusion that the disparity between these two
figures is 'statistically significant' does not, however, require an a prori finding that
these deviations are 'legally significant'....,, 16
One reason the concept of statistical significance is not entirely satisfactory
results from the effect of sample size. In large samples, small percentage differ-
ences will be statistically significant. To say that a relationship is statistically sig-
nificant at the 95% level of confidence means that there is a 5% or lower
109. 430 U.S. at 494 n.13.
110. See Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1022 (1st Cir. 1974),ceri. dened 421
U.S. 910 (1975); Vulcan Soc'y of N.Y. City Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 393 (2d
Cir. 1973).
111. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1982).
112. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34.
113. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430 (1975).
114. 430 U.S. at 496 n.17.
115. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 915 (5th Cir. 1973).
116. 550 F.2d at 584.
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probability of concluding that there is a relationship when, in fact, there is none. I"7
This statement, however, ignores the strength of the relationship; it does not tell us
how important it is. A pass rate difference, for example, that is insignificant at the
5% level may be larger than another case in which it is significant at even the 1%
level. The level of significance indicates only that one can be more confident of
the existence of a relationship in the latter case. Consequently, when concluding
that a relationship is statistically significant, one may be saying little about its
magnitude when the sample size is very large.
When samples are very small, large differentials are necessary to obtain statisti-
cally significant results. This fact raises the concern that the test is not as powerful
as a test based on larger samples. In other words, when the sample size is small
there may be a high probability of concluding that there is no discrimination
when, in fact, it exists.1""
The courts have been wary of statistics based on small sample sizes, but for
different reasons. In Teamsters the Supreme Court suggested that an employer
could defeat a prima facie showing of discrimination by demonstrating that
"during the period it is alleged to have pursued a discriminatory policy it made
too few employment decisions to justify the inference that it had engaged in a
regular practice of discrimination."'1 9 In Mayor of Philadelphia there was a 19%
disparity between the percentage of blacks in the city's population (34%) and the
percentage of blacks on a panel to nominate members to the school boards (15%).
However, since there were only thirteen members on the panel, the Supreme Court
supported the district court's ruling that the "number of positions on the Panel
was too small to provide a reliable sample; the addition or subtraction of a single
Negro meant an 8% change in racial composition."1 20
Such numbers are obviously very small, but one may wonder what the critical
sample size might be. In Roman v. ESB, Inc. 12 1 83 workers were laid off of which 53
(63%) were black, and 30 (47%) were white. The plant was 54% nonwhite. The
court ruled "in light of the small statistical sampling involved . . . this figure does
not prove a discriminatory layoff. . . . Only a small change (8) in the numbers of
blacks and whites involved would yield a ratio the same as that of blacks to whites
in the plant."' 22
In some "small numbers" cases, quite a few people may be involved. For
example, in Ochoa v. Monsanto Co.,' 23 during the relevant period there were 684
applicants, of which 11 were Mexican-American. Fifty-six people were hired, of
which one was Mexican-American. Here, Mexican-Americans were hired at a
faster rate than other applicants, but the crucial issue is that "the smallness of the
numbers demonstrates that the Court was not compelled to allow such statistical
showing to set in train the usual presumptions or to make a finding of preference
117. Statisticians call this mistake a Type I error.
118. Statisticians call this mistake a Type II error.
119. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977).
120. Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 611 (1973).
121. 550 F.2d 1343 (4th Cir. 1976).
122. Id. at 1352.
123. 473 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1973).
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thereon.' 1 24 In Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 125 13 out of 33 self-identified
black or Spanish applicants passed a test while 1737 out of 3089 whites passed the
test, producing a pass rate difference of 17%. The district court felt that the statis-
tics were "obviously meager" and declined to find that "in themselves" they estab-
lished a prima facie case.' 2 6 In contrast, a work force of approximately 500 was
regarded as "sizeable" in F'sher,12 7 and 870 was large in Castaneda.128
Many other factors affect the courts' decisions to consider the plaintiff's statis-
tical evidence as probative. Theoretical considerations require the samples to be
randomly selected from the population. In some situations past discriminatory
practices may "chill" the applicant pool, which is then not a random sample. In
Boston Chapter the court used this argument to consider statistical evidence which it
might otherwise have rejected due to its small size.' 29 In Roman, another case in
which there was a small sample, the court considered
the undisputed economic necessity that compelled the cutback in employees, the reduction
in the number of tube loaders needed after the change in the production process, and the
uncontradicted evidence as to the selection of those to be laid off on the basis of the affected
positions rather than on any personal criteria.'
30
While statistical evidence is sufficient to shift the burden of proof in some situa-
tions, it is not always necessary and many other factors are considered. The courts
have made this point many times, most clearly in Teamsters:
We caution only that statistics are not irrefutable; they come in infinite variety and, like
any other kind of evidence, they may be rebutted. In short, their usefulness depends on all
of the surrounding facts and circumstances.
13 1
A major reason for discrediting a parity study is the omission of variables that
may explain the disparity. As the court said in United States V. Ironworkers Local
86,132 the use of statistics must be conditioned on the "absence of variables which
would undermine the reasonableness of the inference of discrimination which is
drawn .... ,"'33 In the studies discussed above, the importance of considerations
such as experience and job-related qualifications have been stressed. In Unted
States v. United States Steel Corp .1 34 the court ruled that seniority is relevant in wage
disparity cases. 135 In Swint v. Pullman-Standard'36 wage statistics were ruled to be
unreliable because they did not consider seniority, overtime, and time worked. 137
Other potential factors include plant hiring needs and whether employees choose
to work in that particular plant or job. If any one of these variables is incorpo-
124. Id. at 320.
125.. 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974).
126. Id. at 1019 n.3.
127. Fisher v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 527, 544 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. dented, 449 U.S.
1115 (1981).
128. 430 U.S. at 496.
129. 504 F.2d at 1021 n.6.
130. 550 F.2d at 1352.
131. 431 U.S. at 340.
132. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971).
133. Id. at 551.
134. 520 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976).
135. Id. at 1054.
136. 539 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1976).
137. Id. at 97.
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rated into a parity study in addition to race or another allegedly "discriminatory"
variable, the analysis, by definition, is multivariate, and multivariate statistical
methodologies must be used.
D. Multivariate Analysis as a Measure of the Significance of Disparity
The multivariate methodology that the courts have used extensively is regres-
sion analysis.138 When discrimination was a less topical issue and evidence of dis-
crimination was more obvious, there was little need for complex statistical
methodologies. Discrimination is now a much more sensitive issue and its manifes-
tation is more subtle. For example, firms may hire blacks and whites in proportion
to their distribution in the population, but then discriminate between the two
groups by paying different wages. Regression analysis enables the courts to iden-
tify whether wage differentials are significantly different due to some discrimina-
tion factor, such as race, or whether the disparities result from some justifiable
causes. A standard model for defining salary discrimination is:
Salary = f (Demographics, Productivity,
Demographics X Productivity). (1)
For example, if D is a binary demographic variable equal to unity for the pro-
tected group and zero for the majority group, and P is a productivity measure, a




B. + BID +B +B 3(DP) +e (2)
Demographic variables (D) include race, sex, or marital status. Productivity vari-
ables (P) may include experience, qualifications, education, and other on-the-job
measures such as ratings and absenteeism. The variable "demographics X produc-
tivity" (DP) indicates that some of the discriminatory demographic variables, such
as race and sex, interact with some of the productivity variables. It allows for the
possibility that productivity has different effects on the salaries of protected and
nonprotected group members.
Discrimination is evidenced if the coefficients of the relevant demographic vari-
ables indicate a significantly lower mean salary for the protected group such as
when B , is negative and significant. In this case the "intercepts" are significantly
different. Discrimination is also evidenced if the coefficients of the interaction
terms indicate that productivity factors have a significantly smaller effect on the
138. Several articles have detailed the relevance of regression analysis to employment discrimination
cases. See, e.g., Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of Multiple Regression Studies in Race and Sex Discrimination
Cases, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 737 (1980); Smith & Abram, Quantiative Analysis and Proof of Employment Discrini-
nation, 1981 U. ILL. L.F. 33, 34 n.3 (for a complete bibliography of such studies). For an introduction to
regression analysis, see Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702 (1980). If one
is interested in a simple comparison between two means, regression has three advantages over a simple t-
statistic. First, the results are easy to obtain using standard computer packages. Second, the regression
coefficient itself provides information; typically, it would be the parity difference, an indication of the
strength, a/?er controlling for other correlated factors, such as experience and qualifications. Third, the t-
statistic provides a measure of statistical significance, again after controlling for other variables. If there is
only one explanatory variable the measure of significance, the t-statistic, is identical in both methods. The
major advantage of regression analysis, however, is that important explanatory factors can be effectively
and easily controlled by simply including them in the equation.
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protected group's salary than on the majority group's salary, that is, when (B), is
negative and significant. In this case the "slopes" are significantly different.
The courts have recognized three potential problems with regression analyses.
First, the effects of discrimination may be underestimated if some of the produc-
tivity variables are themselves functions of discriminatory behavior. For example,
in James v. Stoc/ham Valves and Fittings Co. the court found "the critical factors of
'skill level' and 'merit rating' were defined in such a way as to incorporate discrim-
ination."'' 39 In Mecklenburg v. Montana State Board of Regents of Higher Education ,140
the defendant's regression analysis included variables relating to promotion and
tenure which the plaintiffs expert had already found discriminated against
women. 14 1 In Stasiny v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. ,142
[d]efendant's regressions use certain independent variables that are themselves apparently
the result of sex discrimination .... The independent variable 'years of schooling' is also
male-biased, since defendant has until recently purposely discriminated against women
with college degrees. 1
4 3
Essentially, courts have argued in these cases that the model of salary discrimi-
nation described above is incomplete and that one should add to the model an
equation of the form:
Productivity = g (Demographics) + u. (3)
Plaintiffs may try to establish the importance of the relationships between produc-
tivity and demographics while defendant corporations will typically try to show
that they are unimportant.
A second common problem in many empirical analyses is measurement error.
Productivity is a particularly difficult concept to measure accurately. In Agarwal v.
McKee & Co.,' 44 the plaintiffs regression analysis included "years of experience"
and "years of education" but was criticized for not coding the type of quality of
experience and education.' S In Stastny, the judge argued that "[t]he variable
'salary class' is not a productivity factor but rather is the result that, theoretically,
productivity factors would explain."' 46 Implicitly, then, the judge postulated:
Salary class = h (Productivity) + v. (4)
In statistical terms "salary class" is an indicator of productivity. Even if the error
term v has no correlation with the true measure of productivity, the ordinary least
squares estimators in equations (1) and (2) are inconsistent and, in the two-vari-
able cases, are asympototically biased towards zero. 147 Fortunately, recent statis-
tical advances enable the analyst to overcome this problem as long as there are
multiple indicators of productivity. 48
139. 559 F.2d at 332.
140. 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11,438 (1976).
141. Id. at 6496.
142. 458 F. Supp. 314, 323 n.3 (W.D.N.C. 1978), afd in part and rev'd h part, 628 F.2d 267 (4th Cir.
1980).
143. Id. at 323 n.3.
144. 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8301 (1977).
145. Id. at 5574.
146. 458 F. Supp. at 323 n.3.
147. J. JOHNSTON, EcONOMETRIC METHODS 281 (2d ed. 1972).
148. Since these methods are quite sophisticated, they will not be discussed here. The reader is
referred to the following: Boardman, Hui, & Wold, The Partial Least Squares-Ft Point Method of Estinatihg
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A third problem is the omission of crucial variables, productivity again being
the most important. In Mecklenburg the plaintiff's and defendant's salary studies
were criticized because "qualitative variables [teaching ability, research contribu-
tions, community contributions, etc.] were not considered.' 1 4 9 These variables are
major measures of productivity. Similar criticisms were raised in Presseisen v.
Swarthmore College,150 and in Pennsylvania v. Local 542 International Union of Operating
Engineers,' 5 1 where the defendant argued that the plaintiff's analysis omitted cru-
cial factors, most importantly skill. In Agarwal the plaintiff's regressions were criti-
cized because they "totally excluded certain kinds of information which could
have had some bearing upon salary such as job level at McKee, prior salary, and
past overseas assignment."'' 52
A fourth problem is specification error, which can occur in a number of ways.
In one situation a statistician may omit the interaction term (DP) in equation (2).
This means that while the "intercepts" differ, the "slopes" are forced to remain the
same, thus assuming incorrectly that productivity has the same effect on salary for
protected group members and majority group members. Expert testimony identi-
fied this problem in Presseisen.153 In another situation the statistician may estimate
equation (2) and conclude that there is discrimination when in fact the true model
is logarithmic:
logS = a + b logP + w. (5)
In this case the statistician may conclude that there is discrimination when, in fact,
there is none. Only with the correct formulation of the model will it be concluded
correctly that there was no discrimination. (That is, no demographic (D) variable
appears in the true model, equation (5).) McCabe, in his article on the use of
regression analysis in discrimination cases, provides an example that illustrates
when such conclusions may occur.15 4
Many other problems have been identified but they are often case-specific,
sometimes incorrect, and sometimes appear to be based more on lack of familiarity
with regression than on the regression analyses themselves. For example, in Dtcker-
son v. United States Steel Corp.: 15 5
Interdependent Systems with Latent Variables, in A 10 COMMUNICATIONS IN STATISTICS 613 (1981); Joreskog &
Goldberger, Estimation of a AIodel with Multiple Indicators and A'ultihle Causes of a Single Latent Variable, 70 J.
AM. STATISTICAL A. 63 (1975); Jbreskog, A General Methodfor Estimating a Linear Structural Equation System, in
STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 85 (1973).
149. Mecklenberg v. Montana State Bd. of Regents of Higher Educ., 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
11,438, at 6496 (1976).
150. 442 F. Supp. 593, 616 (E.D. Pa. 1977), af'dmem., 582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir. 1978).
151. 469 F. Supp. 329 (E.D. Pa. 1978), ajfd, 648 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1981).
152. Agarwal v. McKee & Co., 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8301, at 5573 (1977).
The court may justifiably reject regression models that omit important variables, particularly if those
variables are correlated with membership in the protected group. However, when omitted variables are
not obvious measures of productivity or if their effect on the dependent variable might be minimal, courts
should be less willing to reject the plaintiff's regressions. If there is any doubt, the burden should fall on the
defendant to prove that these omitted variables were omitted erroneously and that omission was respon-
sible for the observed disparity.
153. 442 F. Supp. at 615.
154. McCabe, The Interpretation of Regression Analysis Results in Sex and Race Discrimination Problems, 34
AM. STATISTICIAN 212 (1980).
155. 439 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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The court did strike the regression analyses because they contained evidence outside the
limitations period. In that situation, however, the statistical technique was much more
sophisticated and sensitive. The court felt that inclusion of the earlier data would so
severely influence the regression curves' shapes as to render the analyses irrelevant. 156
Nonetheless, the court did allow summary statistics based on the same data as the
regression analyses because "[t]his inactive study, the Court believes, does not have
the same problems of delicacy [as does the regression]." 157
While statistical methodologies involving the calculation of I-statistics, chi-
square statistics or regression coefficients do have problems, the evidence suggests
that the courts have become increasingly sophisticated and are sufficiently familiar
with the problems to ensure that these methodologies are used appropriately. 158
Indeed, the courts have demonstrated their ability to use the results from more
sophisticated methodologies, such as logit analysis, should such results be
presented. 159
In summary, the courts have progressed enormously in their analysis of dispa-
rate impact over the last decade. 16 They have moved with the times and become
familiar with relatively sophisticated statistical techniques. Given this progress, it
is with some concern that we view the administrative agencies' advocacy of reli-
ance on a simple rule-of-thumb or "bottom line" principle such as the 80% rule.
Some of the potential impacts of this rule are examined in Part III.
III
THE IMPACT AND RAMIFICATIONS OF THE 80% RULE
A. The 80% Rule
According to the 80% rule:
A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) or
(eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by
the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact, while a greater than four-
fifths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of
adverse impact. 
16 1
To clarify this rule, suppose there are only two groups, as in Table 1. Under the
four-fifths rule the protected group may claim adverse impact ifx l/n is less than
156. Id. at 79 n.25.
157. Id.
158. See Greenspan v. Automobile Club of Mich., 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 30,812 (E.D. Mich.
1980); Vuganich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 31,480 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
159. See, e.g., Greenspan v. Automobile Club of Mich., 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 30,812 (E.D.
Mich. 1980). Thus far multivariate statistical methods have rarely been used to study hiring and promo-
tion decisions, partially because regression analysis is an inappropriate method when the dependent vari-
able can take only discrete values. In hiring and promotion cases for example, the dependent variable may
be dichotomous, Y = I if the individual were hired or promoted and Y = 0 otherwise. This type of model
could be written in a form analogous to equation (1):
P(Y = 1) = g (Demographics, Productivity, Demographics X Productivity) (6)
and can be estimated by logit or probit analysis. Appropriate methodologies are available to estimate
models with polychotomous dependent variables.
160. For some techniques and methodologies that may be used in the future, see Conway & Roberts,
Reverse Regression, Fairness, and Employment Discrimination, 1 J. Bus. & ECON. STATISTICS 75 (1983); Kaye,
Statistical Evidence ofDzscrimination, 77 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 773 (1982).
161. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (1978), 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D (1982).
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80% ofx 2/n 2 . The majority group could potentially claim "reverse discrimina-
tion" ifx 2/n 2 is less than 80% ofxl/n 1 .
According to Blumrosen, "Grzggs was the stick, threatening an employer with a
finding of illegality, an injunction, and financial consequences if his business prac-
tices perpetuate the inferior status of minorities and women. The bottom line is
the carrot, rewarding the employer whose practices 'mirror' the congressional pur-
pose. "162 Certainly the four-fifths rule will encourage employers to follow the rule
and thus reduce the probability of liability. However, there are several problems
that seriously weaken its usefulness. To begin this discussion the four-fifths rule
will be evaluated in light of the previous sections.
The four-fifths rule measures the applicant-flow and, therefore, belongs to cells
M or N of Table 2. The criterion itself belongs to the arbitrary percentage differ-
ence category in Table 3. All of the problems associated with applicant-flow statis-
tics and arbitrary percentage differences discussed in the previous section pertain
to the four-fifths rule.
A major conclusion that emerged from an analysis of the cases in Table 2 was
that the courts are unwilling to rely exclusively on a single parity study. In order
to shift the burden of proof, a plaintiff typically presented the results of many
different types of comparisons. After all, the courts were unwilling to rely exclu-
sively on statistical data which they had found could be quite misleading. If only
one type of parity study could be presented, there was a preference for studies that
used as a reference the composition of the work force at some other level within the
firm (column 4) rather than the applicant pool (column 3).
Under the four-fifths rule, there would be a tremendous incentive to "chill" or
manipulate the applicant pools in ways that would be detrimental to protected
groups. In order to obtain a high selection rate for a protected group, the com-
pany has an incentive to discourage minority applications, which is quite contrary
to the intent of any reasonable antidiscriminatory policy.
When one considers the four-fifths rule in light of Table 3 one is immediately
struck by the arbitrary nature of the 80% rule. Why 80% rather than 85% or 90%?
More importantly, the rule ignores the concepts of chance and statistical signifi-
cance. As a consequence, three problems arise: (1) there is a high probability that
an employer will be found to be discriminating under the four-fifths rule, when in
fact, he is not discriminating; (2) there is a high probability that an employer will
be held harmless due to compliance with the four-fifths rule when, in fact, he is
discriminating against a group of employees; and (3) the four-fifths rule and statis-
tical significance criterion indicate discrimination in quite different situations.
To illustrate the first two points consider again Table 1. A company selects
employees from a pool of N applicants, n i of whom belong to a protected group
and n 2 of whom belong to the majority group. From this pool the company hires a
fixed number of employees Y, of which x , belong to the protected group and x2
belong to the majority group. If the company does not discriminate, the
probability that it will hire a member from a group equals the proportion of mem-
162. Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 6.
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bers of that group in the applicant pool. The probability of drawing a person from
a particular group will not remain constant, and the number of people selected
from a group is hypergeometrically distributed. If, however, N is large relative to
Y, then the number of people selected from a group is approximately binomially
distributed. 163 Making this simplifying assumption, one can easily compute the
probability that a perfectly nondiscriminating employer will violate the four-fifths
rule. In a recent article, Boardman used the binomial distribution to calculate the
probability that the protected group could claim adverse impact when, in fact, the
employer is not discriminating, and these results are presented in Table 4.164 One
sees immediately that when few people are selected, the probability that a group
could claim adverse impact when, in fact, the firm does not discriminate is very
high. Even when fifty people are selected the probability of an incorrect claim of
adverse impact is greater than 20%.
TABLE 4
PROBABILITY THAT THE 80% RULE WOULD PERMIT A CLAIM OF
DISCRIMINATION BY THE PROTECTED GROUP WHEN IN
FACT NONE EXISTS
Relative Total Number Selected (I')
Group Size
5 10 15 20 25 50
n I = (3/ 7 )n2 .528 .383 .297 .416 .341 .223
n, = n2  .500 .377 .304 .252 .345 .240
n, = (7/3)n 2  .472 .350 .278 .392 .323 .218
Source: Boardman, Another Analysit of the EEOCC "Tour-Fifhs" Rule, 25 MGMT. Scl. 770,
773 (1979).
Conversely a company may, in fact, be discriminating but still comply with the
four-fifths rule. Suppose, for example, the two groups are of equal size so that the
probability of selecting an employee from the protected group is 50% when the
firm does not discriminate. But suppose the firm discriminates; instead of hiring
protected group employees with a 0.5 probability, it hires them with a lower
probability. The company may still satisfy the four-fifths rule. Probabilities that a
firm will satisfy the four-fifths rule when, in fact, it is discriminating are given in
163. The binomial distribution is appropriate when people are hired independently of one another
and the probability of drawing a member of a particular group remains constant. This probability is likely
to remain relatively constant unless there are major changes in the applicant pool mix. In practice, many
firms are hiring from the applicant pool which simultaneously is being supplied with new members. The
mix of the pool will not change dramatically unless there are major demographic changes or the largest
employers make substantial hiring or firing decisions that are inconsistent with the applicant pool mix. In
the absence of major changes in the applicant pool mix, the binomial distribution should be used in prefer-
ence to the hypergeometric distribution.
164. Boardman, Another Analysts of the EEOCC "Four-Fifhs" Rule, 25 MGMT. Sci. 770, 773 (1979).
When the work force consists of more than two groups, the probabilities that a group could claim adverse
impact where none exists are even higher than those shown in Tables I and 2.
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Table 5. These probabilities generally decrease as the number of employees
selected increases and as the extent of the discrimination increases. Nonetheless, in
some instances the probabilities of these incorrect outcomes are quite large.
TABLE 5
PROBABILITY PROTECTED GROUP CANNOT CLAIM ADVERSE IMPACT
WHEN IT Is DISCRIMINATED AGAINST
n = (3/ 7 )n 2  n 1 =n 2  n1 = (7/3)n2
Total
number Pla =.2 P, =.3 P, =.2 P, =.3 P, =.4 P, =.2 P, =.3 P, =.4 P, =.6
selected (Y)
5 .263 .472 .058 .163 .317 .007 .031 .087 .187
10 .322 .617 .033 .150 .367 .001 .011 .035 .172
15 .352 .703 .018 .131 .390 .0 .004 .034 .151
20 .196 .584 .010 .112 .404 .0 .0 .006 .058
25 .189 .659 .002 .044 .268 .0 .0 .002 .032
50 .186 .777 .000 .012 .234 .0 .0 .0 .016
Source: Boardman, Another Analysis of the EEOCC "Four-Fifths"Rule, 25 MGMT. Sci. 770, 773 (1979).
a P, = True probability of hiring a protected group member.
Being aware of some problems associated with strict adherence to the four-
fifths rule, the promulgating agencies attempted to clarify and interpret their
employee selection guidelines in March, 1979, in the form of a series of questions
and answers. 165 Of particular importance are those situations in which unusually
large or small numbers of people are selected. With regard to small number cases,
the interpretations state:
[G]enerally, it is inappropriate to require validity evidence or to take enforcement action
where the number of persons and the difference in selection rates are so small that the
selection of one different person for the job would shift the result from adverse impact
against one group to a situation in which that group has a higher selection rate than the
other group.166
In practice, this modification of the four-fifths rule makes little difference.
With respect to large sample cases, the interpretations state that "relatively
small differences in selection rates may nevertheless constitute adverse impact if
they are both statistically and practically significant."'' 67 While practical signifi-
cance is not defined, the guidelines do suggest that when "large numbers of selec-
tions are involved, it would be appropriate to calculate the statistical significance
of the difference in selection rates."' 68
Let us examine if the conclusions differ very much depending on whether one
uses the four-fifths rule or the concept of statistical significance. The results of an
analysis of this examination are presented in Table 6 and are calculated on the
165. 44 Fed. Reg. 11,997 (1979) (Adoption of Questions and Answers to Clarify and Provide a
Common Interpretation of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures).
166. Id. at 11,999.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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assumption that there are two groups of equal size. The first column contains the
number of successful applicants. The second column presents situations in which
the protected group could claim adverse impact under the four-fifths rule. For
example, if the company selects ten employees, the protected group may claim
adverse impact under the four-fifths rule if four or fewer protected group members
were hired. Of the situations chosen for exemplification, the results under the
four-fifths rule differs from those under the guideline's small sample size modifica-
tion only when five applicants are hired. 69
TABLE 6
SITUATIONS IN WHICH PROTECTED GROUP MEMBERS COULD CLAIM
ADVERSE IMPACT
Number of Protected Group Members Selected
Total Statistical Statistical
Number 4/5 Significancea Significancea
Selected (Y) Rule (Independence)b (Y constant)
5 0-2 0 0
10 0-4 0-2 0- 1
15 0-6 0-4 0-3
20 0-8 0-6 0-5
25 0-11 0-8 0-7
50 0-22 0- 19 0- 18c
100 0- 44 0- 41 0- 41c
200 0- 88 0- 88 0- 88C
400 0- 177 0- 183 1 0- 183c
a Using a 5 percent level of significance and a one-sided alternative.
b Calculated using the normal approximation and assuming Y/N is not close to unity.
C Calculated using the normal approximation to the binomial.
The last two columns present analogous data using the statistical significance
criterion. 70 In many court cases, statisticians assume that the hiring process for
169. In this case, a group could claim adverse impact if none or only one group member were hired.
170. It is up to a court to choose a threshold of significance beyond which an imbalance is considered
evidence of discrimination. One commonly used threshold has been the 5% prohability level. Operation-
ally, the most commonly accepted maximum chance of error has been 5%. Thus, we are interested in
situations in which the probability of a particular outcome, given that the company has not engaged in
discriminatory practices, is less than 5%. Suppose that Y people are selected and that two groups are of
equal size so that a company does not discriminate when P, = P2 = 0.5. Under the "statistically signifi-
cant" rule, we are interested in those values ofx 1 such that:
PA (X I - x I Y, PI = 0.5) <0.05 (7)
These probabilities are obtained easily from the cumulative binomial tables or by using the normal
approximation to the binomial, and are presented in column four. Notice that the absolute size of the
applicant pool is irrelevant. Only the relative size is required to determine PI and P2, under the assump-
tion of no discrimination.
It is more common in court cases to test for significant differences between two selection rates using the
formula:
Xi/ nl - x 2/n2
Z =(8)x/",(1-') (i/n t + lln2)
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one group is quite independent of the hiring process for the other group and, con-
sequently, the total number of people selected is a random variable. Such an
assumption is appropriate in an employment setting in which all applicants who
score above some predetermined level on a test are hired. Under this assumption,
the proportion of applicants from each group which is hired is approximately nor-
mally distributed if the applicant pools are large. Situations in which the pro-
tected group may claim that it has been discriminated against under this criterion
are presented in the third column of Table 6. In most employment situations,
however, the employer, in attempting to maximize profit, will initially determine
the number of employees to be selected which is subsequently considered as a pre-
determined constant. In this situation, the number of protected group members
selected is distributed approximately binomially or hypergeometrically. Situations
in which the protected group may claim that it has been discriminated against,
assuming a binomial distribution, are presented in the last column.
Table 6 shows that there is a substantial difference between the situations in
which a group of employees may claim adverse impact under the statistical signifi-
cance rules and those under the four-fifths rule. When few individuals are selected
the probability that the protected group might claim adverse impact is much
higher under the four-fifths rule than under the statistical significance rules. When
200 people are selected, the rules are identical, while for larger selections the statis-
tical significance rules are more stringent for the employer than is the four-fifths
rule.
An additional problem with the four-fifths rule is that it ignores everything
besides the selection rate; the courts have long recognized that the simple parity
studies presented in Table 2 are appropriate only when no other variable is impor-
tant. According to the preceding discussion of regression analysis, it is clear that
the courts and employers recognize that skill and productivity are important and
legitimate factors in hiring and promotion decisions. In contrast, the guidelines
ignore these variables.
The rule also encourages undesirable corporate responses. Suppose that a firm
does not discriminate but that productivity variables are important for a partic-
ular position. A correctly performed multivariate analysis would reveal that dem-
ographic variables are insignificant and productivity variables are significant so
that a discrimination case would be won by the defendants under current legisla-
tion. However, a corporation would have a strong incentive to comply with the
four-fifths rule in order to avoid potentially large legal and administrative costs.
where " Y/(n + n 2). Ifn I = n 2 the formula reduces to
x 1 -x 2
Z = -(9)
/ Y - (Y2/N)
where Y=xl + X 2
The test statistic z is asymptotically normally distributed. Since we are likely to have prior information
that the selection rate of group 1 is less than group 2 we will use a one-sided alternative and we require to
know the values of x 1 such that
P(z < -1.645) = .05 (10)
These numbers are presented in column three of table 6.
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In such situations average work force quality may decline. Conversely, some firms
may have desired to discriminate in the past but were discouraged from doing so
because of ignorance relating to the decision rules used by the courts or the admin-
istrative agencies. Now they may push the four-fifths rule to its limit. As we have
seen, the rule allows considerable latitude for discrimination.
The problem is more complex with some junior positions. Most large organiza-
tions attempt to create a pool of junior employees from which future promotions
will be made. Although certain skills and qualifications may be unnecessary for
the immediate position, they are rationally required by the organization."7 '
"Warm-body" comparisons almost completely ignore this point. This type of rule,
therefore, is appropriate only when skills and qualifications are not required for
the present position and there is little likelihood that individuals from within the
organization will be promoted to positions requiring greater skill, education, and
productivity. Indeed, "warm-body" rules, to the extent that they discourage the
hiring of workers with such potential, will encourage organizations to recruit for
more skilled or senior positions from outside the organization.
Finally, it is important to remember that the four-fifths rule ignores wage dis-
crimination. Under the rule a corporation may pay majority group workers more
than protected group workers whether majority group workers are more, less, or
equally productive than protected group workers.
IV
CONCLUSION
This analysis has attempted to demonstrate two major points: (1) over time
the courts have become increasingly competent in dealing with employment dis-
crimination cases, including the use of appropriate statistical comparative
frameworks and sophisticated statistical methodologies; and (2) recent federal
guidelines have introduced a four-fifths rule which has serious weaknesses. Our
conclusion is that the introduction of such a "warm-body" rule could prove to be a
serious impediment to the progress of the courts. While the administrative agen-
cies' yearning for such a simple and straightforward rule is understandable, we
have argued that the outcomes are likely to be highly unsatisfactory. The weak-
nesses of the four-fifths rule can be summarized as follows: (1) in many cases the
rule will signal the prima facie existence of discrimination when, in fact, it does not
exist; (2) in many cases the rule will not detect discrimination when, in fact, it does
exist; (3) the rule ignores the central role that future and potential skill plays in our
modern society; (4) the rule ignores the emerging centrality of wage discrimina-
tion; and (5) the rule downplays the use of statistical significance despite its
advantages.
The courts' progress in dealing with statistical comparisons and methodologies
has been substantial, and that progress should not be interfered with lightly. For-
171. See Gwartney, Asher, Haworth & Haworth, Stal tzcs, the Law and Title IT'L An Economt " iew, 54
NOTRE DAME LAw. 633, 642 (1979).
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tunately, the courts appear to view the guidelines with increasing skepticism. For
example, the Second Circuit recently noted:
The [Supreme] Court appears to have applied the Guidelines only to the extent that they
are useful, in the particular setting of the case under consideration, for advancing the basic
purposes of Title VII . . . . To the extent that the Guidelines reflect expert, but non-
judicial opinion, they must be applied by the courts with the same combination of defer-
ence and wariness that characterizes the proper use of expert opinion in general . ...
They are entitled to deference, not obedience.
1 7 2
172. Guardians Ass'n of the N.Y. City Police Dep't v. Civil Service Comm'n. 630 F.2d 79, 91 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. dented, 452 U.S. 940 (1981).
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